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PUBLIC-FIGURE DEFAMATION ACTIONS IN SOUTH
CAROLINA-COURTS STAY MINDFUL OF THE
DEFENDANT'S STATE OF MIND
I. INTRODUCTION
"Defame, v. To lie about another. To tell the truth about another."'
While success in a defamation action is not completely divorced from the truth
of the allegedly defamatory statement (Bierceian satire notwithstanding), generally
the state of mind of the defendant is a crucial factor. When a public-figure plaintiff
brings a defamation action, he must be ready to present not just circumstantial
evidence that should have or could have raised doubts as to the accuracy of the
statement, but must also provide clear and convincing evidence pertinent to the
alleged defamer's state of mind regarding the statement.
This Comment discusses recent cases in which the Supreme Court of South
Carolina has found in favor of defamation defendants where there is a lack of
evidence indicating the defendants had the requisite "actual malice" state of mind.
These reversals are in spite of the fact that the plaintiffs were able to cast doubt on
the ultimate truth of the statements. This trend, a very positive one in light of the
fundamental liberties at stake, will likely be ongoing.
Part II of this Comment provides a brief overview of public-figure defamation
law in South Carolina. Part III presents three recently decided cases involving
public-figure defamation plaintiffs, and Part IV contemplates the potential for
reversal of the most recent case. Part V provides concluding remarks.
II. DEFAMATION LAW, ACTUAL MALICE, AND SOUTH CAROLINA
A. Development
On March 9, 1964, common-law defamation went out the window with the
United States Supreme Court's decision in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.
2
Sullivan and several other public officials successfully brought a libel suit against
the Times for publishing an advertisement relating to its mistreatment of those
fighting for civil rights;3 at trial evidence showed that the descriptions therein were
not entirely accurate.4 The Supreme Court reversed the ruling of the Alabama
1. AMBROSE BIERCE, THE DEVIL'S DICTIONARY 29 (Dover Publications Inc., 1958) (1911).
2. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
3. Id. at 264-65.
4. Id. at 258-59.
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Supreme Court and famously created a rule "that prohibits a public official from
recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct,
unless he proves that the statement was made with 'actual malice'-that is, with
knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or
not."5
The progeny of the New York Times case affects numerous aspects of state
defamation law. Many of these defamation cases are discussed in Chief Justice
Toal's concurring opinion in Holtzscheiter v. Thomson Newspapers, Inc. ,6 in which
she provided a new analytical framework to clarify the "mind-numbingly
incoherent" aspects of South Carolina defamation law.7 As stated in Holtzscheiter,
the elements of defamation include:
(1) a false and defamatory statement concerning another; (2) an
unprivileged publication to a third party; (3) fault on the part of
the publisher [which implicates the actual malice standard when
the plaintiff is a public figure]; and (4) either actionability of the
statement irrespective of special harm or the existence of special
harm caused by the publication.8
With regard to fault of the publisher, Toal's framework provides that, in order
for a public person to recover for reputational injury in South Carolina, one must
show actual malice by "clear and convincing proof."9 As to summary judgment
under South Carolina Rule of Civil Procedure 56, South Carolina's Supreme Court
found the logic in Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. ' persuasive and stated that "the
appropriate standard at the summary judgment phase on the issue of constitutional
actual malice is the clear and convincing standard."' "I
The Holtzscheiter case, while setting forth the clearest statement of the actual
malice standard, is certainly not the first statement of actual malice in South
5. Id. at 279-80.
6. 332 S.C. 502, 506 S.E.2d 497 (1998).
7. Id. at 516, 506 S.E.2d at 505 (Toal, J., concurring).
8. Id. at 518, 506 S.E.2d at 506.
9. Id. at 522-23, 506 S.E.2d at 508 (quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342
(1974)). See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 285-86 (1964) (referring to the
"convincing clarity which the constitutional standard demands").
10. 477 U.S. 242, 255-56 (1986) (finding the appropriate summary judgment question was
"whether the evidence on the record could support a reasonablejury finding either that the plaintiff has
shown actual malice by clear and convincing evidence or that the plaintiff has not").
11. George v. Fabri, 345 S.C. 440, 454, 548 S.E.2d 868, 875 (2001); see also Sunshine
Sportswear & Elecs., Inc., v. WSOC Television, Inc., 738 F.Supp 1499, 1505 (D.S.C. 1989)
("Summary judgment occupies a position of great importance in libel actions as compared with other
civil actions, due to the possible chilling effect on constitutionally protected speech which would result
from the defense of defamation claims.").
[Vol. 55: 641
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Carolina. 2 In Miller v. City of West Columbia,
3 the plaintiff was defamed when his
superior, Broom, reported, and The State newspaper printed, that Miller had
sexually harassed a co-worker. 1
4 The Supreme Court of South Carolina affirmed the
trial court ruling for Miller because "Broom's conclusion .. . was factually
unsupported."' 5 Also, the court found "that Broom had serious reservations about
[the victim's] allegations," which amounted to making the statement "with reckless
disregard for the truth."'
6
The court also encountered the actual malice standard in Peeler v. Spartan
Radiocasting, Inc., ' 7 where Peeler, an incumbent state senator, had successfully
brought a libel action against a television station and its reporter. Peeler alleged the
defendant's television news stories implied that he was involved in forging names
on a ballot petition.'" In its de novo review of the the actual malice issue, the court
found no evidence of actual malice. The court adopted the reasoning of McMurry
v. Howard Publications, Inc.
9 that "a subjective awareness of probable falsity
cannot be demonstrated under the standard of 'convincing clarity' namely, by
evidence showing the publisher and the plaintiff disagreed with respect to their
perceptions of events which they both observed."
2
B. Recent Cases Bring the Subjective Intent Aspect of Actual Malice Into
Sharp Relief
Recently in South Carolina, courts have applied the actual malice standard
several times in cases public-figure plaintiffs have brought. In each, the supreme
court overturned the court of appeals on the ground that the evidence did not
support a finding of actual malice.
2
Read alone, the cases present a sympathetic factual scenario for the respective
12. In fact, the actual malice standard was not applied in Holtzscheiter because it involved 
a
private-figure plaintiff. Holtzcheiter, 332 S.C. at 511,506 S.E.2d at 502.
13. 322 S.C. 224, 471 S.E.2d 683 (1996).
14. Id. at 227, 471 S.E.2d at 685.
15. Id. at 228, 471 S.E.2d at 686.
16. Id. at 229, 471 S.E.2d at 686. "At trial, Broom stated, '[that he] was uncertain about 
[the
victim's] allegations. [He] had no firm conclusions[, and] honestly did not know whom 
to believe."'
Id.
17. 324 S.C. 261, 478 S.E.2d 282 (1996).
18. Id. at 263, 478 S.E.2d at 283.
19. 612 P.2d 14 (Wyo. 1980), cited in Peeler, 324 S.C. at 266-67, 478 S.E.2d at 285.
20. Peeler, 324 S.C. at 266-67, 478 S.E.2d at 285 (quoting McMurry, 612 P.2d at 14); see infra
note 70 (discussing Peeler and the "rational interpretation" doctrine).
21. Elder v. Gaffney Ledger, Inc., 333 S.C. 651, 511 S.E.2d 383 (Ct. App. 1999), rev 'd, 
341 S.C.
108, 533 S.E.2d 899 (2000); Fleming v. Rose, 338 S.C. 524, 526 S.E.2d 732 (Ct. App. 2000), rev'd,
350 S.C. 488, 567 S.E.2d 857 (2002); cf. Anderson v. Augusta Chronicle, 355 S.C. 461, 
585 S.E.2d
506 (Ct. App. 2003) (As of the time this Comment was published, the Supreme Court 
of South Carolina
had not yet issued a decision on whether the evidence supported a finding of actual 
malice), cert.
granted, No. 3597, Shearouse Adv. Sh. No. 37 at 12 (Oct. 13, 2003).
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plaintiffs; each plaintiff was featured in a prominent news story of arguably dubious
veracity, and each suffered damage to his reputation. Looking at the less-than-
compelling accuracy of the statements in question22 and the resulting harm in each
case, the plaintiffs seem entitled to recover. However, this ex post "gut reaction"-
that the defendants should have exercised more care and perhaps investigated
further---does not properly take into account whether the "state of mind required for
actual malice [was] brought home" to the publishers.23 As the United States
Supreme Court stated in Harte-Hanks Communications Inc., v. Connaughton,
reckless disregard for the truth is "more than a departure from reasonably prudent
conduct," and a "failure to investigate . . . is not sufficient to establish reckless
disregard."24
Although the statement's truth is not irrelevant to the actual malice inquiry,25
there is a fine line between considering evidence of a statement's truth and losing
sight of the state of mind of the publisher altogether. The actual malice
determination focuses on the state of mind of the defamer. Reading Fleming, Elder,
and Anderson together illustrates how such a determination can inadvertently
transform from an evaluation of actual malice into an evaluation of the truth or
falsity of the defamatory statements themselves.
This metamorphosis appears to occur during the daunting task of determining
if the publisher "entertained serious doubts" as to the truth or falsity of the
statements. This task is daunting because, due to the great chance of error in
determining the subjective state of mind of a self-interested defendant after-the-fact,
the proof can be provided by circumstantial evidence.26
22. In Elder, the defamatory statement was the transcript of an anonymous call alleging that
Elder, the Blacksburg Police Chief, was being paid off by drug dealers. See Elder, 341 S.C. at 112-13,
533 S.E.2d at 901. The statement in Fleming related to disciplinary action against Fleming for failing
to fully discuss information pertinent to an ongoing investigation. Fleming, 350 S.C. at 493, 567 S.E.2d
at 859. In Anderson, the defamatory statements related to an assertion the plaintiff told the defendant
newspaper he was in the National Guard and subsequent questioning by the paper of defendant's
integrity in an editorial entitled "Let the Liar Run." Anderson, 355 S.C. at 468-69, 585 S.E.2d at
510-11.
23. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 287 (1964).
24. 491 U.S. 657, 688 (1989).
25. Id. at 668 ("[A] plaintiff is entitled to prove the defendant's state of mind through circum-
stantial evidence .... and it cannot be said that evidence concerning motive or care never bears any
relation to the actual malice inquiry."
26. See St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968).
The defendant in a defamation action brought by a public official cannot,
however, automatically insure a favorable verdict by testifying that he published
with a belief that the statements were true. The finder of fact must determine
whether the publication was indeed made in good faith. Professions of good faith
will be unlikely to prove persuasive, for example, where a story is fabricated by
the defendant, is the product of his imagination, or is based wholly on an
unverified anonymous telephone call. Nor will they be likely to prevail when the
publisher's allegations are so inherently improbable that only a reckless man
would have put them in circulation. Likewise, recklessness may be found where
[Vol. 55:641
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The defendant's state of mind is of paramount importance because, ultimately,
the First Amendment's umbrella of protection extends to speech that is "a product
ofaprocess ofjudgment that is independent, audience oriented, and grounded in a
reasoned effort to publish information... judged useful and important for the
maintenance of freedom in a self-governing society"
2 7-considerations which
implicate the publisher's state of mind. Although this leaves room for error, such
error must be in favor of defendants," for, in the words of Mr. Justice Black: "[t]his
Nation, I suspect, can live in peace without libel suits based on public discussions
of public affairs and public officials."
'29
Therefore, in cases such as those discussed below where there is only
circumstantial evidence as to the truth of the defamatory statements and little
evidence as to the actual state of mind of the alleged defamer, it is appropriate to
conclude that the plaintiff is unable to prove actual malice with convincing clarity.
II. ACTUAL MALICE IN ACTION: THREE DIFFICULT CASES
A. Fleming v. Rose
The Supreme Court of South Carolina's latest word on actual malice is Fleming
v. Rose.3" In Fleming, the only direct evidence as to the state of mind of Rose (the
alleged defamer) was his testimony that he believed in the veracity of the reports
provided to him in the course of an investigation that he oversaw-reports which
"he had no reason to doubt."' Although there was circumstantial evidence that he
had some uncertainty about the source of the information and the handling of the
investigation, such uncertainty does not work to counter the evidence of Rose's
subjective belief in the information's truth. Thus, the supreme court properly
applied the actual malice standard to determine that Rose lacked the requisite state
of mind for defamation liability.
3 2
Fleming was a state trooper who spoke with another trooper, Cobb, who was
involved in an accident.33 The first investigation into the accident had been botched;
consequently two more investigations probed an alleged cover-up of the first
investigation.34 During the third investigation Cobb spoke with Fleming and
there are obvious reasons to doubt the veracity of the informant or the accuracy
of his reports. Id. at 732.
27. Randall P. Bezanson, The Developing Law of Editoial Judgment, 78 NEB. L. REv. 754,760
(1999).
28. In cases involving public-figure plaintiffs and media defendants any uncertainity usually
favors the defendants.
29. Times, 376 U.S. at 297 (Black & Douglas, J., concurring).
30. 350 S.C. 488, 567 S.E.2d 857 (2002).
31. Id. at 497, 567 S.E.2d at 861.
32. Id. at 494-97, 567 S.E.2d at 860-62.
33. Id. at 491, 567 S.E.2d 859.
34. Id. at 491, 567 S.E.2d at 858-59.
MEDIA LAW20041
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allegedly provided information that would have hastened the outcome of the final
investigation.35 The investigators concluded that Fleming failed to report the entire
conversation with Cobb. Fleming was disciplined, and his name was included in
a press release issued by Rose regarding the disciplinary action against the troopers
involved in the imbroglio.36
Fleming brought suit for defamation and the trial court granted summary
judgment to Rose, "ruling that Fleming was a public official" and that there was no
evidence of actual malice on Rose's part.37 The South Carolina Court of Appeals
reversed the trial court and held that there was evidence from which the jury could
infer Rose acted with actual malice.3"
The Supreme Court of South Carolina reversed the court of appeals and
reinstated the trial court's grant of summary judgment.39 The supreme court noted
that the court of appeals relied on the following facts: (1) It was not normal
department policy to include the names of officers in notifications of disciplinary
proceedings; and "(2) the fact that the investigation did not involve Fleming's direct
supervisor, Caulder."'4 The court held that the former was not violative of a
"professional standard" and that the latter was "not supported by the record."4 '
Instead, the Supreme Court honed in on the evidence directly relating to Rose's
actual state of mind regarding the truth of the statement itself: "Rose testified he
had no reason to doubt the investigation was not thorough, solid, correct, and
truthful. 4 2 Such a characterization of Rose's testimony differs from that of the court
of appeals, which noted:
Rose testified he had "no idea" where information implicating
Fleming originated. Rose further testified he was not aware
Caulder had not been interviewed regarding the information he
received from Fleming. Rose could not remember stating in an
interview "these men set a deplorable example" but conceded
"there were a lot of mistakes made in this case. 43
This testimony, while pertaining to Rose's subjective belief regarding the
investigation generally, is not indicative of his subjective belief as to the truth or
falsity of his statement. Instead, the testimony relates to how the investigation was
35. Id. at 491-92, 567 S.E.2d at 859.
36. Fleming, 350 S.C. at 492-93, 567 S.E.2d at 859.
37. Fleming v. Rose, 350 S.C. 488, 493, 567 S.E.2d 857, 859 (2002).
38. Fleming v. Rose, 338 S.C. 524, 541, 526 S.E.2d 732, 741 (Ct. App. 2000), rev "d 350 S.C.
488, 567 S.E.2d 857 (2002).
39. Fleming, 350 S.C. at 497, 567 S.E.2d at 862.
40. Id. at 495-96, 567 S.E.2d at 861.
41. Id. at 496, 567 S.E.2d at 861. Caulder's testimony regarding questioning by investigator Ivey
was equivocal, and Ivey testified that he did interview Caulder.
42. Id. at 497, 567 S.E.2d 861.
43. Fleming, 338 S.C. at 536, 526 S.E.2d at 738-39 (Ct. App. 2000).
[Vol. 55: 641
6
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 55, Iss. 3 [2004], Art. 16
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol55/iss3/16
2004] MEDIA LAW 641
conducted and ultimately whether or not the statement (that Fleming failed to report
fully the contents of the Cobb conversation) was true. The supreme court declined
to use the circumstantial evidence and "read between the lines" where Rose's actual
belief was clear, and the circumstantial evidence also showed Rose could rely on
his information."
Fleming demonstrates how direct evidence of the defamer's subjective belief
in the statement's truth must be rebutted with more thanjust circumstantial evidence
of the possibility of a statement's falsity. The circumstances must be such that
serious doubt as to the truth of the statement surely must have been raised in the
alleged defamer's mind.
B. Elder v. Gaffney Ledger
Actual malice was also a matter of contention in Elder v. Gaffney Ledger.
45 As
in Fleming, attendant circumstances produced some uncertainty as to the accuracy
of the alleged defamatory statements. Also like Fleming, the plaintiff's
circumstantial proof was not enough to counter the alleged defamer's subjective
belief in the truth of the statement.
46
Wayne Elder, the Chief of Police for the town of Blacksburg, South Carolina,
brought suit against the Gaffney Ledger after it printed an editorial statement
hypothesizing that drug dealers were paying off the Chief; at trial "[t]he jury
awarded him $10,000 in actual damages and $300,000 in punitive damages."
'47
The South Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed the lower courts ruling,
48 relying
upon evidence that the editor, Sossamon, "failed to investigate or verify the
information" that appeared in the editorial, that the newspaper erased the recording
that led to the editorial, that "Sossamon pled guilty to manufacturing marijuana in
1991," and "that he had been 'rude' to Chief Elder's wife on one occasion.
'
The Supreme Court of South Carolina reversed the court of appeals, stating that
the evidence was "patently insufficient to demonstrate Sossamon in fact entertained
serious doubts as to the truth of the publication."
5 The court gave short shrift to
inferences drawn by the court of appeals from the facts that Sossamon did not
investigate the call and the tape was erased.
5' To the contrary, the supreme court
discussed how Sossamon had a belief in the chief s tipoffs, and how the tape
44. Fleming, 350 S.C. at 497, 567 S.E.2d at 861-62.
45. 341 S.C 108, 533 S.E.2d 899 (2000).
46. Id. at 118-19, 533 S.E.2d at 904-05.
47. Id. at 112-13, 533 S.E.2d at 901. The alleged defamatory statement appeared 
in a column
entitled, "What's Your Beef?," which invited readers to express their thoughts anonymously 
to an
answering machine. Id. at 112 n.2, 533 S.E.2d at 901 n.2.
48. Elder v. Gaffney Ledger, Inc., 333 S.C. 651, 664, 511 S.E.2d 383, 390 (Ct. App. 
1999).
49. Elder, 341 S.C. at 115, 533 S.E.2d at 902.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 115-16, 533 S.E.2d at 902-03.
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ultimately was made available to the plaintiff.52 Additionally, the supreme court
noted that Sossamon viewed his own marijuana arrest as a positive development in
his life and that it was unrelated to Chief Elder. 3
The only evidence the court considered pertinent to the actual malice inquiry
was "Sossamon's failure to investigate an anonymous phone call" and the"speculative testimony" regarding possible ill will by Sossamon toward Chief
Elder,54 both of which related to Sossamon's state of mind. Although the court
acknowledged that "evidence of ill will may, in some circumstances, be relevant to
demonstrate motive," the court found the evidence of ill will directed at Elder's wife
to have no relevance in demonstrating malice towards Elder."
With regard to Sossamon's failure to investigate, the court observed that "the
only testimony regarding Sossamon's subjective belief' in the veracity of the
publication was where he "testified that he believed the information [in the column]
could be true."56 In light of Sossamon's belief, the court "simply [could not] say he
purposefully avoided the truth' in printing the column"57 without investigating.
As in its analysis in Fleming, the court properly focused its evaluation on the
defendant's state of mind; the only direct evidence thereof was Sossamon's own
belief that the statement could be true, and the circumstantial evidence was not
strong enough to raise doubts in Sossamon's mind."8
C. Anderson v. The Augusta Chronicle
The latest episode in South Carolina's actual malice analysis is Anderson v.
Augusta Chronicle."' Like Elder, this case involved allegations that a newspaper
should have investigated further before publishing a statement about the plaintiff.
In 1996, Tom Anderson unsuccessfully pursued a seat in the South Carolina
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 118-19, 533 S.E.2d at 904.
55. Elder v. Gaffney Ledger, 341 S.C. 108, 117, 533 S.E.2d 899, 903 (2000). The court also goes
out of its way to highlight the distinction between constitutional actual malice and ordinary malice or
ill will. Id. at 117-18, 533 S.E.2d at 903-04.
56. Id. at 118, 533 S.E.2d at 904. Interestingly, Sossamon's belief was premised on the fact,
"essentially conceded" by the Chief at trial, that Elder "knew some people in Blacksburg who had been
selling drugs for many years and had not done anything about it." Id. at 118 n.8, 533 S.E.2d at 904 &
n.8. Apparently, the Chief also had "called Sossamon to advise him that a Newspaper employee had
been hanging out with a known drug dealer." Id. at 118, 533 S.E.2d at 904. For a similar case
addressing an editor's belief as to truthfulness of an opinion letter, see Fort Worth Star-Telegram v.
Street, 61 S.W.3d 704 (Tex. Ct. App. 2001). The court in Street upheld summary judgment for the
defendant based on a lack of actual malice where the editor's affidavit claimed belief in the statement's
truth, lack of doubt, and the affidavit "provide[d] insight into what he thought the [defamatory] letter
said and the factual basis for his understanding." Id. at 711.
57. Elder, 341 S.C. at 118, 533 S.E.2d at 904.
58. Id. at 118-19, 533 S.E.2d at 904-05.
59. 355 S.C. 461,585 S.E.2d 506 (Ct. App. 2003), cert. granted, No. 3597, Shearhouse Adv. Sh.
No. 37 at 12 (Oct. 13, 2003).
[Vol. 55: 641
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General Assembly.6" During the election, he went to North Carolina for ten weeks
to work as an insurance claims adjuster for the National Flood Insurance Program.
6'
The next year, when Anderson ran for a seat in a special election, a reporter for the
Chronicle asked him about his absence. The Chronicle published an article
mentioning that Anderson was out of the area with the National Guard.
62 The
"National Guard" absence was again misstated in a later article, and the newspaper
contacted Anderson about the resulting political accusations that Anderson lied
about his National Guard Service.6 a Subsequently, the Chronicle published an
editorial entitled "Let the Liar Run," again referencing Anderson's purported
statement about the National Guard Service." Nearly a month later, the newspaper
published a "[c]larification" which recited Anderson's version of 
the story.65
At trial, the court granted the Chronicle's motion for a directed verdict on
Anderson's libel action on the grounds that "Anderson failed to show constitutional
malice.,6 6 The South Carolina Court of Appeals, however, reversed the trial court's
ruling, and held that Anderson's testimony and documentary evidence in the record
were sufficient to raise a jury question regarding the existence of actual malice.
67
The court's actual malice analysis focused on the Chronicle's failure to
investigate its own reporter's accuracy, because "the evidence points to a mistake
or misunderstanding between the reporter and his interview subject," and that Kent,
the Chronicle's editor, "never spoke with Anderson to obtain his side of the
story.
68
Although, like Peeler,69 this case involved a plaintiff-subject who disagreed
with an alleged media defamer's report, the court distinguished Peeler by
construing the Chronicle's alleged defamatory statements as misquotes instead of
statements reflecting a misconception of events.
7" The court noted that the facts
presented by Anderson, including his resume and the fact that a man of his age
60. Id. at 466, 585 S.E.2d at 509.
61. Id. at 466-67, 585 S.E.2d at 509.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 467, 585 S.E.2d at 509. Anderson asserted that the reporter confused the National Flood
Insurance Program with the National Guard.
64. Id. at 469, 585 S.E.2d at 510.
65. Anderson v. Augusta Chron., 355 S.C. 461,470, 585 S.E.2d 506, 511 (Ct. App. 2003), cert.
granted, No. 3597 Shearhouse Adv. Sh. No. 37 at 12 (Oct. 13, 2003).
66. Id. at 470, 585 S.E.2dat 511.
67. Id. at 490, 585 S.E.2d at 521.
68. Id. at 479-80, 585 S.E.2d at 516.
69. 324 S.C. 261, 266-67, 478 S.E.2d 282, 285 (1996) ("A subjective awareness of probable
falsity cannot be demonstrated [to] 'convincing clarity' [merely] by evidence showing that the publisher
and the plaintiff disagreed with respect to their perceptions of events which they both observed."); see
supra nn. 17-20 and accompanying text.
70. Anderson, 355 S.C. at 480-81, 585 S.E.2d at 516-17. Both parties and the court apparently
agreed that Peeler adopts the "rational interpretation" doctrine of Time, Inc. v. Pape, 401 U.S. 279
(1971), which does not extend to alleged misquotations. Id. at 481, 585 S.E.2d at 516; see also Masson
v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496, 518 (1991).
MEDIA LAW2004]
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would likely not be in the National Guard,7 as information that should have caused
the Chronicle to realize that "Anderson's purported statement was highly
improbable."72
The South Carolina Court of Appeals also distinguished a similar case, Speer
v. Ottaway Newspapers, Inc.,73 by stating that the Anderson case did not involve "a
publisher's failure to guess accurately among conflicting accounts of a perceived
event."74 In Speer, the newspaper knew both versions of the story, but in Anderson,
the newspaper never spoke with Anderson to determine his side of the story.
7
Based on Anderson's testimony and the "irrefutable documentary evidence in
the record," the court ruled that the newspaper had "no more reason to believe" its
reporter's recollection of the initial conversation with Anderson than Anderson
himself, and therefore, the evidence was sufficient to send the question of whether
the Chronicle published the editorial with actual malice to the jury.76
IV. LOOKING FORWARD: IS AN ACTUAL MALICE REVERSAL APPROPRIATE FOR
ANDERSON?
Reading Anderson and Elder together is puzzling. In Anderson, sufficient
evidence was presented to justify sending the question of actual malice to a jury
because a newspaper failed to follow-up on a story before printing, but in Elder the
lack of follow-up was insufficient to show actual malice. Like Elder, Anderson
closely follows one of the situations set forth in St. Amant v. Thompson,77 but there
is a critical difference: the allegation was that Anderson claimed to be in the
National Guard, and not that he actually was in the National Guard.78 However,
either the cases must be harmonized or Anderson must be reversed in order to
provide predictability and consistency in South Carolina law.79
The problem with Anderson is its overemphasis on circumstantial evidence
regarding the ultimate truth of the statement and the lack of focus on the defamer's
actual state of mind. Thus, unless Anderson can prove a "knowing falsehood," he
"must establish [that the Chronicle] in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth
71. Id. at 483-84, 585 S.E.2d at 518.
72. Id. at 483-84, 585 S.E.2d at 518.
73. 828 F.2d 475 (8th Cir. 1987).
74. Anderson, 355 S.C. at 480, 585 S.E.2d at 516.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 488-90, 585 S.E.2d at 520-21.
77. 390 U.S. 727 (1963). It is likely that directly alleging Anderson was in the National Guard
would be an "allegation[] so inherently improbable that only a reckless man would have put them in
circulation." Id. at 732. See supra note 26.
78. Additionally, Anderson involves a series of related defamatory statements, as opposed to the
lone editorial in Elder.
79. The Supreme Court of South Carolina granted certiorari on October 3, 2003. See No. 3597,
Shearhouse Adv. Sh. No. 37 at 12 (Oct. 13, 2003).
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of the publication."'' 0 To quote the dissent, "evidence of Anderson's personal
recollection of the interviews fails to shed light on what The Chronicle believed in
good faith about the truth of the statements it published.""
1 In short, actual malice
does not seem to be clearly and convincingly proved, which would make the trial
court's directed verdict proper.82
If Anderson is not reversed or otherwise modified, it may have serious
implications for the media in South Carolina. Generally, much news is based on
highly improbable statements by public figures that are untrue; often the statement
is newsworthy not for its content, but for the fact that it was made.
In such situations, the subjective actual malice standard allows the press to do
its job of reporting newsworthy events-even the making of statements so
outrageous or improbable that the statements "must" be untrue. Requiring a
newspaper to double-check an otherwise credible reporter's account simplybecause
the facts of the story are improbable moves too far from a consideration of the
defamer's state of mind and runs afoul of the purpose for which the actual malice
standard was established.
8 3
Double-checking would be required in any instance where the subject of the
account could potentially complain of an inaccuracy,
4 because under Anderson,
such complaints by the alleged defamation victim can be used to establish serious
doubts on the part of the publisher as to the truth or falsity of the publisher's
statement. Under Anderson, such "doubts" are sufficient to lead to a costly trial.
Because of the lack of information relating to the Chronicle's subjective intent
and the lack of evidence showing any doubt in fact as to its reporter's veracity, a
reversal on appeal to the Supreme Court of South Carolina would be proper.
8 "
V. CONCLUSION
The Times malice standard and the cases that follow it provide a fortress for
protected speech that can only be penetrated by a public-figure plaintiff who has
clear and convincing evidence of actual malice. The plaintiff bears a heavy burden
because the implications of libel suits by public-figure plaintiffs are so great.
The particular South Carolina cases discussed in this Comment are but a narrow
80. Anderson, 355 S.C. at 473, 585 S.E.2d at 512.
81. Id. at 492, 585 S.E.2d at 523 (Hearn, C.J., dissenting).
82. Regarding clear and convincing proof, see supra note 9.
83. This proposition is succinctly stated in Speer v. Ottaway Newspapers, Inc., 828 F.2d 475 (8th
Cir. 1987), where the court stated the following: "[T]o prevent the self-censorship that may arise if a
critic of official conduct were compelled to guarantee the actual truth of all factual assertions on pain
of a libel judgment virtually unlimited in amount." Id. at 478.
84. This category would encompass essentially any unrecorded interview between a single
reporter and subject.
85. Such a reversal would additionally provide the court an opportunity to apply Holtzscheiter
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slice of the defamation pie, showing one of the more subtle points that may arise in
defamation actions by public-figure plaintiffs: the importance of proving the alleged
defamer's state of mind through evidence of the defamer's subjective belief as to
the truth or falsity of his statement. Plaintiffs who bring a defamation action must
be sure their case is brimming with pertinent evidence not only about the statements
made and the surrounding circumstances, but specifically relating to the state of
mind of the alleged defamer. For the sake of a democratic society fueled by open,
fiery debate, bringing such actions should not become any easier.
Eric G. Zaiser
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